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WHEN TO BE A COURT OF LAST RESORT: 
THE SEARCH FOR A STANDARD OF  
REVIEW FOR THE SUSPENSION  
CLAUSE 
Abstract: Although the war on terror has not resulted in a suspension of 
habeas corpus, the conflict has presented the courts with increasingly 
complex issues regarding what level of due process should be granted to 
detainees. The judicial scrutiny of legislative acts passed in the wake of the 
September 11, 2001 attacks, most notably the Military Commissions Act of 
2006, creates the potential for Congress to suspend the writ of habeas cor-
pus altogether in the event another terrorist attack occurs. This Note ex-
plores what level of scrutiny should be applied to such a suspension, as-
suming that the courts do not declare the issue a political question. 
Between a deferential standard focusing on an analogy to the war powers 
and a more searching form of judicial review focusing on the writ’s impor-
tance in individual liberty and due process, the courts would have a com-
plex challenge in applying the correct standard. This Note ultimately con-
cludes that the deciding factor in such a case would be the indefinite 
nature of the suspension itself, determined primarily by the length of de-
tention a detainee had faced, the availability of judicial process, and the 
length of time that passed since an attack warranting suspension occurred. 
Introduction 
The Privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus shall not be suspended, unless 
when in Cases of Rebellion or Invasion the public Safety may require it. 
—United States Constitution1 
 When the founding fathers drafted the Suspension Clause in 
Philadelphia following the failure of the Articles of Confederation, 
there was fierce debate over whether the federal government should 
ever have the power to suspend habeas corpus.2 The drafters recog-
nized the significance of the writ as a method of bringing a prisoner 
before a court, often to ensure that the prisoner’s imprisonment or de-
                                                                                                                      
1 U.S. Const., art. I, § 9, cl. 2. 
2 See Eric M. Freedman, The Suspension Clause in the Ratification Debates, 44 Buff. L. Rev. 
451, 455–58 (1996). 
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tention is not illegal.3 The drafters themselves had lived through several 
suspensions of habeas corpus by Parliament throughout colonial times 
and during the American Revolution, which led to their view that sus-
pension served as an “engine of oppression.”4 The suspension of the 
writ challenges us to examine whether it is ever appropriate to forgo 
the important right in an effort to protect the nation.5 The drafters 
thought it was appropriate in certain circumstances to suspend the writ, 
but remained silent about the level of judicial review that should apply 
to a suspension.6 Given this ambiguity, the question of what is consid-
ered a “rebellion or invasion” pursuant to the Suspension Clause is in-
creasingly complex, especially amid a war on terrorism.7 
  This Note seeks to explore the standard of review and level of 
scrutiny that should be applied to the internal limitations of the Sus-
pension Clause by the judicial branch in the event the writ of habeas 
corpus is suspended.8 The term “internal limitation” refers to the re-
quirement of an invasion or rebellion, and ignores the possibility that 
external limitations could also be used to challenge a suspension.9 The 
                                                                                                                      
3 Black’s Law Dictionary 728 (8th ed. 2004); Freedman, supra note 2, at 455–58. 
4 Freedman, supra note 2, at 456–57 (quoting Luther Martin, Genuine Information VIII 
( Jan. 22, 1788), in 15 Documentary History of the Ratification of the Constitu-
tion 434 ( John P. Kaminski & Gaspare J. Saldino eds., 1984)); Amanda L. Tyler, Is Suspen-
sion a Political Question?, 59 Stan. L. Rev. 333, 344 (2006). These suspensions occurred in 
1688, 1696, 1714, 1722, 1744, and during the American Revolution. Tyler, supra, at 344. 
The American Revolution suspensions included six separate suspensions between 1777 
and 1783. Paul D. Halliday & G. Edward White, The Suspension Clause: English Text, Imperial 
Contexts, and American Implications, 94 Va. L. Rev. 575, 644, 651 (2008) (noting the irony of 
suspension in the colonies during rebellion given that “[c]olonial British Americans were 
stripped of the fundamental characteristic that had bound them to people living in Eng-
land: their common subjecthood, indicated in part by the common availability of habeas 
corpus”). 
5 See Tyler, supra note 4, at 413 (quoting Duncan v. Kahanamoku, 327 U.S. 304, 330 
(1946) (Murphy, J., concurring)). 
6 See Freedman, supra note 2, at 455–58; Tyler, supra note 4, at 334. 
7 See U.S. Const., art. I, § 9, cl. 2; Boumediene v. Bush, 128 S. Ct. 2229, 2274–75 (2008). 
8 Tyler, supra note 4, at 412. The scope and meaning of the Suspension Clause is a 
complex and debatable issue that remains pertinent today, but is beyond the scope of this 
Note. See id. This Note seeks to expand upon the question left by Professor Tyler as to what 
level of scrutiny should be applied by the courts in the event of a suspension of habeas 
corpus, while not completely foreclosing the possibility that suspension may in fact be a 
political question in certain circumstances. See id. 
9 See id. at 408. For example, a prisoner could hypothetically challenge a suspension as 
a violation of the Fifth Amendment in the face of a suspension that only applies to a sus-
pect class, such as race or creed, in a discriminatory manner. See id. It is debatable whether 
such limitations would apply in the face of a suspension, and this Note does not explore 
that possibility. See id. Rather, the Note focuses on the internal limitations found in the 
Suspension Clause itself. See U.S. Const., art. I, § 9, cl. 2. 
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conventional notion has been that a suspension of habeas corpus 
would be a non-justiciable political question, but recent developments 
in the war on terror and commentary by modern legal scholars have 
challenged this idea.10 The concept of judicial review of suspension is 
more than an academic exercise given the recent unsuccessful attempts 
by Congress to circumvent the writ of habeas corpus by statute.11 Addi-
tionally, Professor Amanda L. Tyler speculates there is “good reason to 
believe that another attack would be met with invocation of the suspen-
sion power by Congress.”12 The idea that suspension is not a political 
question suggests an important role for judicial review during tumultu-
ous times in our nation, yet leaves unresolved the question of what level 
of review should be used.13 
 The purpose of this Note is to explore how a court would deter-
mine what level of judicial review should be given in an examination of 
congressional suspension of the writ of habeas corpus.14 In the event a 
court did review a suspension, it has been speculated that the lack of 
applicable precedent could lead a court to apply either a rational basis 
review, deferential to the political branches, or strict scrutiny, a search-
                                                                                                                      
10 See, e.g., Boumediene, 128 S. Ct. at 2240 (reviewing whether Congress had provided an 
adequate substitute for habeas corpus for detainees in Guantanamo Bay); Hamdi v. Rums-
feld, 542 U.S. 507, 578 (2004) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (suggesting if habeas corpus had been 
suspended in the wake of the September 11, 2001 attacks, the validity of suspension itself 
would be a non-reviewable political question); Tyler, supra note 4, at 412–13 (concluding 
that the limitations on the suspension authority constitute judicial questions). 
11 See, e.g., Military Commissions Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-366, 120 Stat. 2600 (codi-
fied at scattered sections of 10, 18, 28, and 42 U.S.C.) (“No court, justice, or judge shall 
have jurisdiction to hear or consider an application for a writ of habeas corpus filed by or 
on behalf of an alien detained by the United States who has been determined by the 
United States to have been properly detained as an enemy combatant or is awaiting such 
determination.”); Authorization for Use of Military Force, Pub. L. No. 107-30, 115 Stat. 
224 (codified at 50 U.S.C. § 1541 (2006)) (declaring in the wake of September 11, 2001 
terrorist attacks that “the President is authorized to use all necessary and appropriate force 
against those nations, organizations, or persons he determines planned, authorized, com-
mitted, or aided the terrorist attacks that occurred on September 11, 2001, or harbored 
such organizations or persons, in order to prevent any future acts of international terror-
ism against the United States by such nations, organizations or persons”). The Military 
Commissions Act of 2006 was recently challenged in Boumediene v. Bush, highlighting the 
difficulty the government has faced in circumventing the courts in the war on terror and 
possibly increasing the likelihood that a future attack would lead the government to sus-
pend the writ of habeas corpus altogether. 128 S. Ct. at 2263. 
12 Tyler, supra note 4, at 335. 
13 See id. 
14 See id. at 412. This question is based upon the assumption that suspension is review-
able, and may very well be reviewed, by the courts in the event it took place. See id. Profes-
sor Tyler suggests the current war on terror raises the threat of a suspension of habeas 
corpus given the detention issues that have arisen during the conflict. Id. at 335. 
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ing judicial review standard that gives less weight to the discretion of 
the political branches.15 Depending upon the approach taken, the in-
ternal limitation contained in the Suspension Clause, that habeas cor-
pus may only be suspended “in cases of rebellion or invasion [when] 
the public safety may require it,” could be interpreted differently by a 
court.16 Part I of the Note lays out a brief history of the Suspension 
Clause, including the drafting of the clause and case law interpreting its 
meaning.17 Part II explores suspensions of the writ of habeas corpus in 
the United States, examples in martial law and war power cases, and the 
recent suggestions in the war on terror cases regarding judicial review 
of suspension.18 This Part presents two competing views on judicial re-
view of a suspension: the deferential review similar to that granted to 
the war powers and a searching judicial review standard based upon 
habeas corpus’ importance as an individual right.19 Part III applies this 
framework to a series of hypothetical suspensions in an effort to analyze 
what judicial review of the internal limitation contained in the Suspen-
sion Clause might look like.20 
I. A Brief History of the Suspension Clause in the United States 
A. The Suspension Clause in the Constitution 
 Before delving into the subject of suspension itself, it is important 
to recognize some basic concepts regarding the history and exercise of 
the writ of habeas corpus.21 The writ’s historical purpose in the United 
States has been to ensure that those who are detained have the oppor-
                                                                                                                      
15 Id. at 411. The idea of a searching judicial review refers to a strict scrutiny standard based 
upon the level of analysis a court is willing to engage in to review governmental action. See id. 
16 U.S. Const., art. I, § 9, cl. 2; Tyler, supra note 4, at 408–09; see also Martin v. Mott, 25 
U.S. (12 Wheat.) 19, 31 (1827) (proposing that the President would have to put forth a 
weak argument in the exercise of war powers for the Court to engage in a strict scrutiny 
analysis of whether an invasion exists). 
17 See infra notes 21–54 and accompanying text. 
18 See infra notes 55–160 and accompanying text. 
19 See infra notes 55–160 and accompanying text. 
20 See infra notes 161–265 and accompanying text. 
21 See Richard H. Fallon, Jr. & Daniel J. Meltzer, Habeas Corpus Jurisdiction, Substantive 
Rights, and the War on Terror, 120 Harv. L. Rev. 2029, 2036–37 (2007). The term habeas 
corpus translates literally to “that you have the body.” Daniel R. Coquillette, The An-
glo-American Legal Heritage 248 (2d ed. 2004). The writ developed slowly over time, 
originally used to secure persons in custody, but by the sixteenth century becoming a tool 
to challenge imprisonment. Id. at 248–49. Historically, the purpose of the writ was not to 
challenge the merits of a detention, but rather whether the detention had a lawful basis. 
Id. at 249. Despite this, “it was, and is, one of the great cornerstones of the rule of law, and 
is now incorporated into Article I, Section 9 of the Constitution of the United States.” Id. 
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tunity to challenge their detainment before a court.22 This right allows 
a prisoner, or a representative of the prisoner, to petition a court to is-
sue a writ demanding that the prisoner’s custodian appear before a 
court to show they have the legal authority necessary for the deten-
tion.23 The process raises several issues, but the three primary questions 
are: Which courts have power to issue these writs and hear such cases? 
What procedural rights the prisoner should be entitled to? And most 
importantly, is the detention itself is legal?24 
 The fierce debate that took place during the drafting of the Sus-
pension Clause left us with little clarity regarding what the right to ha-
beas corpus grants to individuals other than whatever rights are granted 
by Congress, unless they are suspended.25 In 1807, the U.S. Supreme 
Court addressed this question in Ex parte Bollman, forming a middle-of-
the-road approach.26 Chief Justice Marshall’s opinion in Ex parte Boll-
man suggested that the Suspension Clause requires that Congress pro-
vide some court with jurisdiction to hear habeas review, thus giving the 
privilege “life and activity.”27 Otherwise, Marshall noted, the existence 
of the Suspension Clause would be meaningless in the Constitution, 
calling for suspension of a writ only in certain circumstances when in 
fact the right to utilize the writ may not exist in the first place.28 The 
Suspension Clause, in addition to specifying when habeas corpus may 
                                                                                                                      
22 See Fallon & Meltzer, supra note 21, at 2036–37. 
23 Id. 
24 Id. at 2037–40. 
25 Tyler, supra note 4, at 341; see U.S. Const., art. I, § 9, cl. 2. Although the courts have 
never held suspension to be solely within Congress’s authority, its position in Article I of 
the U.S. Constitution suggests this is a correct assumption. Tyler, supra note 4, at 343; see 
U.S. Const., art. I, § 9, cl. 2. 
26 Ex parte Bollman, 8 U.S. (4 Cranch) 75, 95 (1807); Tyler, supra note 4, at 341–42. 
27 Ex parte Bollman, 8 U.S. (4 Cranch) at 95; see Adam Marinelli, Comment, A Call for the 
Proper Recognition of Habeas Corpus in the 21st Century, 3 Charleston L. Rev. 689, 693–94 
(2009). At least one commentator has noted that the Suspension Clause may not in fact pro-
vide the right of habeas corpus given that inferior federal courts were created by congres-
sional choice, rather than constitutional command. Edward A. Hartnett, The Constitutional 
Puzzle of Habeas Corpus, 46 B.C. L. Rev. 251, 254 (2005). Under this approach, the Suspension 
Clause only provides protection against temporary suspensions of the writ, allowing suspen-
sion only within narrow circumstances, and only so long as Congress authorizes inferior fed-
eral courts. See id. This is due to the limited jurisdiction of the U.S. Supreme Court. See id. 
The counter to this argument, however, lies in the fact that Congress would have no defense 
for failing to provide for habeas jurisdiction given that Congress could grant jurisdiction to 
individual justices on the Supreme Court. Id. at 290–91 (noting that Congress should always 
feel “‘with peculiar force, the obligation of providing efficient means by which this great 
constitutional privilege should receive life and activity’” (citing Ex parte Bollman, 8 U.S. (4 
Cranch) at 95)). 
28 Ex parte Bollman, 8 U.S. (4 Cranch) at 95. 
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be suspended, confers by necessity the right to habeas corpus itself.29 It 
is important to emphasize that the framers of the Constitution held the 
privilege of habeas corpus in high regard given its importance in pro-
tecting liberties of individuals.30 The importance of habeas corpus is 
evidenced by the fact that, except in rebellion or invasion, it cannot be 
suspended.31 Even where these circumstances exist, suspension is not 
permissible unless the public safety requires the act.32 The writ holds a 
central place in our nation’s understanding of individual liberties and 
plays an important role in ensuring their protection.33 
 Although the importance of discretion and caution in suspending 
the writ has been emphasized, the power to completely suspend the 
writ does exist within the Constitution.34 During the drafting of the 
Constitution, several versions of the Suspension Clause were sug-
gested.35 The first, drafted by Charles Pinckney, included a provision 
that would allow suspension of habeas corpus, but only for a certain 
period of time.36 Subsequent motions suggested similar solutions, as 
well as recommendations that the writ never be suspended.37 The 
clause we have today passed amid objections that it could become an 
“engine of oppression” in the hands of the federal government, yet 
                                                                                                                      
29 See id. 
30 See Ex parte Merryman, 17 F. Cas. 144, 148 (C.C.D. Md. 1861). Chief Justice Taney 
stated in Ex parte Merryman that: 
The great importance which the framers of the constitution attached to the 
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, to protect the liberty of the citizen, is 
proved by the fact, that its suspension, except in cases of invasion or rebel-
lion, is first in the list of prohibited powers; and even in these cases the power 
is denied, and its exercise prohibited, unless the public safety shall require it. 
Id. 
31 See id. 
32 Id. 
33 See id. 
34 See U.S. Const., art. I, § 9, cl. 2; Ex parte Merryman, 17 F. Cas. at 148. 
35 Freedman, supra note 2, at 455–56. 
36 Id. at 455 (citing 2 The Records of the Federal Convention of 1787, at 334, 
340–42 (Max Farrand ed., rev. ed. 1966)). 
37 Id. at 456. Freedman provides several records of the Federal Convention of 1787 
taken during the drafting of the Suspension Clause, including suggestions from James 
Wilson doubting whether a suspension could be necessary in any case. Id. John Rutledge 
declared that habeas corpus was “inviolable” and could not “conceive that a suspension 
could ever be necessary at the same time through all the States.” Id. Charles Pinckney “urg-
ing the propriety of securing the benefits of the Habeas corpus in the most ample manner, 
moved ‘that it should not be suspended but on the most urgent occasions, [and] then only 
for a limited time not exceeding twelve months.’” Id. 
38 See id. Luther Martin of Maryland made the last motion in the debate, stating in op-
position: 
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these objections could not overcome voices that insisted that there 
might be exigencies that could arise in our nation that would necessi-
tate the government exercising the power.38 Importantly, the drafters 
etched our Suspension Clause into the Constitution without defining 
what constitutes a rebellion or invasion.39 
B. Past Suspensions of the Writ 
 The writ of habeas corpus has been suspended several times in 
U.S. history, and by more than one branch of our government.40 Presi-
dent Abraham Lincoln attempted to suspend the writ of habeas corpus, 
despite the majority view given by Chief Justice Marshall’s statement in 
Ex parte Bollman that if the public safety requires suspension, “it is for 
the legislature to say so.”41 During the Civil War, President Lincoln sus-
pended the writ on several occasions, including in 1862 to “all persons 
arrested, or who are now, or hereafter during the rebellion shall be, 
imprisoned in any fort, camp, arsenal, military prison, or other place of 
                                                                                                                      
As the State governments have a power of suspending the habeas corpus act 
(in cases of rebellion or invasion), it was said there could be no good reason 
for giving such a power to the general government, since whenever the State 
which is invaded or in which an insurrection takes place, finds its safety re-
quires it, it will make use of that power. And it was urged, that if we gave this 
power to the general government, it would be an engine of oppression in its 
hands, since whenever a State should oppose its views, however arbitrary and 
unconstitutional, and refuse submission to them, the general government 
may declare it to be an act of rebellion, and suspending the habeas corpus 
act, may seize upon the persons of those advocates of freedom, who have had 
virtue and resolution enough to excite the opposition, and may imprison 
them during its pleasure in the remotest part of the union, so that a citizen of 
Georgia might be bastiled in the furthest part of New-Hampshire-or a citizen 
of New-Hampshire in the furthest extreme to the south, cut off from their 
family, their friends, and their every connection. These considerations in-
duced me, Sir, to give my negative also to this clause. 
Id. (emphasis removed). 
39 See id.; Tyler, supra note 4, at 334. 
40 See, e.g., An Act Relating to Habeas Corpus, and Regulating Judicial Procedure in 
Certain Cases, ch. 81, § 1, 12 Stat. 755 (1863); Duncan v. Kahanamoku, 327 U.S. 304, 313 
(1946) (reviewing Hawaii Organic Act, ch. 339, § 67, 31 Stat. 141 (1900) which authorized 
the governor of Hawaii to employ a variety of powers, including the power to suspend the 
writ of habeas corpus); Ex parte Merryman, 17 F. Cas. at 148 (reviewing suspension authori-
zation granted by President Lincoln with respect to “all persons arrested, or who are now, 
or hereafter during the rebellion shall be, imprisoned in any fort, camp, arsenal, military 
prison, or other place of confinement by any military authority or by the sentence of any 
court-martial or military commission”); Proclamation No. 1, 13 Stat. 730 (1862). 
41 8 U.S. (4 Cranch) at 101; Tyler, supra note 4, at 343. 
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confinement by any military authority or by the sentence of any court-
martial or military commission.”42 
 In 1861, Chief Justice Taney in Ex parte Merryman held that the 
President cannot suspend the writ of habeas corpus, implying that only 
Congress can suspend the writ.43 Noting the Suspension Clause’s loca-
tion in Article I of the Constitution, along with other legislative powers, 
Taney emphasized that if the executive power was meant to include the 
power of suspension, the Suspension Clause would instead be located 
within Article II.44 Referencing the power held by the executive branch 
of the English government, Taney made it clear that the founders were 
unwilling to give the executive a sweeping power over individual liber-
ties.45 President Thomas Jefferson’s actions in 1806 during the Burr 
conspiracy supported this view.46 At that time, the President never 
claimed the power to suspend the writ, but instead communicated the 
need for suspension to Congress itself.47 A suspension, therefore, would 
likely come from Congress, as it has several times in our history.48 
 Suspensions of habeas corpus may be authorized by Congress, but 
have been a rare event in the United States.49 Following the Civil War, 
President Grant was authorized by Congress to suspend the writ of ha-
beas corpus in 1871 as part of the federal government’s efforts to com-
bat the Ku Klux Klan during the Reconstruction era.50 Next, in 1902 
                                                                                                                      
42 Proclamation No. 1, 13 Stat. 730; see also Proclamation No. 16, 13 Stat. 742 (1864); 
Proclamation No. 7, 13 Stat. 734 (1863). 
43 See 17 F. Cas. at 146. The procedural posture of Ex parte Merryman is rather complex 
and outside the scope of this Note. See id.; Tyler, supra note 4, at 343 & n.45. For a discus-
sion on whether Chief Justice Taney heard Ex parte Merryman in his capacity as Chief Jus-
tice of the U.S. Supreme Court, or rather as a circuit court justice, see Michael Stokes 
Paulsen, The Merryman Power and the Dilemma of Autonomous Executive Branch Interpretation, 
15 Cardozo L. Rev. 81, 90 n.27 (1993). 
44 Ex parte Merryman, 17 F. Cas. at 148–49. 
45 See id. 
46 See id. at 148. 
47 Id. There is evidence to support the fact that President Jefferson requested Congress 
invoke a suspension of the writ in the wake of the Burr conspiracy. Id.; Amanda L. Tyler, 
Suspension as an Emergency Power, 118 Yale L.J. 600, 630–31 (2009). The writ was never sus-
pended by the legislature, however, and President Jefferson never attempted to suspend 
the writ himself, leading to the conclusion that the President did not believe he in fact had 
the power. See Tyler, supra, at 631. 
48 See Ex parte Merryman, 17 F. Cas. at 148. 
49 Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 525 (2004). The Court noted that Congress has 
seen fit to suspend the writ of habeas corpus only in the rarest of circumstances. Id. 
50 Ku Klux Klan Act of 1871, ch. 22, §§ 3–4, 17 Stat. 13, 14–15 (1871). The Act pro-
vided that where the President determined, in his judgment, that the public safety re-
quired habeas corpus to be suspended in order to overthrow a rebellion, he could suspend 
the writ. Id. § 4, 17 Stat. at 15. The Act then related back to the suspension authorized 
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Congress passed a statute allowing the governor of the Philippines Ter-
ritory to suspend the writ in the face of rebellion, insurrection, or inva-
sion in the territory.51 This provision was exercised briefly by the gover-
nor shortly after the law passed to address lawlessness in several 
provinces.52 Lastly, the governor of Hawaii was authorized to suspend 
the writ of habeas corpus by Congress in 1900.53 This statute was last 
used during World War II, and the country has not seen a suspension 
of habeas corpus since.54 
II. Competing Standards of Review 
 The standard for judicial review of a suspension can be examined 
in light of past suspensions in the United States, as well as by analyzing 
the U.S. Supreme Court’s determinations of whether a rebellion or in-
vasion necessitated suspension or the exercise of the war powers  for 
the public’s safety.55 The level of appropriate deference may be similar 
to the broad discretion given to the political branches in the exercise of 
the war powers.56 On the other hand, increased scrutiny due to the 
writ’s importance to individual rights may be applied by a court influ-
enced by concerns regarding the separation of powers and the need for 
review of the important right.57 
                                                                                                                      
during the Civil War and provided the same due process protections. Id. The conditions 
allowed for suspension whenever any unlawful combination of people formed, defined 
broadly as those who conspired to overthrow or oppose the government, in a way that 
could overthrow or set defiance against authorities with violence. See id. §§ 2–3, 17 Stat. at 
13–14. This Act was specifically aimed at the Ku Klux Klan. See id.; District of Columbia v. 
Carter, 409 U.S. 418, 425–26 (1973) (describing the atmosphere in the Southern United 
States during Reconstruction, including the activity of the Ku Klux Klan, and the congres-
sional response authorizing the suspension of habeas corpus). 
51 An Act Temporarily to Provide for the Administration of the Affairs of Civil Gov-
ernment in the Philippine Islands, ch. 1369, § 5, 32 Stat. 691 (1902). 
52 See Fisher v. Baker, 203 U.S. 174, 179–81 (1906) (describing “a state of insecurity and 
terrorism among the people” according to the Governor of the Philippines Territory); 
Tyler, supra note 4, at 346 (noting that habeas corpus was suspended in two provinces fol-
lowing open insurrection by organized bandits). 
53 Hawaii Organic Act, ch. 339, § 67, 31 Stat. 153 (1900); see infra notes 74–90 and ac-
companying text. 
54 See Duncan, 327 U.S. at 304. 
55 See Tyler, supra note 4, at 409–12. 
56 Id. at 409. 
57 Id. at 411; see also San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 17 (1973) 
(noting that where a fundamental right is infringed upon, the correct standard of review 
to be applied is strict scrutiny); Duncan v. Kahanamoku, 327 U.S. 304, 318–19 (1946) (ap-
plying a higher level of scrutiny in light of the likelihood that the war powers may be 
abused by the political branches). 
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A. Deferential Standard: Capitulating to the Political Branches Amid Conflict 
 Ex parte Merryman set the stage for a congressional suspension of 
habeas corpus in 1863 and also offers one of the first judicial insights 
into the standard of review a court might apply to a suspension by Con-
gress.58 The case arose out of President Lincoln’s belief that the execu-
tive not only could suspend habeas corpus at his discretion, as he did 
several times during the war, but give military officers that same discre-
tion as well, leaving it to them whether they would allow prisoners to 
exercise the writ.59 The Court found that the executive branch had no 
such power, leading to one of the greatest potential conflicts between 
the judicial and executive branches.60 This potential conflict was de-
fused by congressional authorization of the executive branch to sus-
pend habeas corpus.61 The opinion, therefore, appears to reinforce the 
notion that the courts would defer entirely to congressional judgment 
in the event of a suspension, calling the legislature’s judgment “conclu-
sive.”62 Although steadfast in this view, the Court also emphasized the 
danger of a suspension and the “extreme caution” that should be exer-
cised in making this decision.63 
 When Congress granted President Lincoln the authority to sus-
pend the writ of habeas corpus in March of 1863, the determination of 
when public safety required it was left to the judgment of the Presi-
dent.64 The Act added built-in judicial review for any prisoners detained 
under the Act.65 The Act further mandated that the Secretaries of State 
and War furnish a list of the names and arrest dates of prisoners as 
soon as practicable to the federal courts in the jurisdiction where the 
                                                                                                                      
58 See 17 F. Cas. 144, 148 (C.C.D. Md. 1861); cf. An Act Relating to Habeas Corpus, and 
Regulating Judicial Procedure in Certain Cases, ch. 81, § 1, 12 Stat. 755 (1863); Tyler, supra 
note 47, at 637–38 (noting that the legislature debated whether to suspend the writ of habeas 
corpus, and thus authorize President Lincoln’s 1861 executive suspension, for two years). 
59 See Ex parte Merryman, 17 F. Cas. at 147–48; cf. Proclamation No. 16, 13 Stat. 742 
(1864); Proclamation No. 7, 13 Stat. 734 (1863); Proclamation No. 1, 13 Stat. 730 (1862). 
60 Ex parte Merryman, 17 F. Cas. at 148. 
61 See An Act Relating to Habeas Corpus, and Regulating Judicial Procedure in Certain 
Cases, ch. 81, § 1, 12 Stat. at 755. 
62 Ex parte Merryman, 17 F. Cas. at 148. 
63 Id. 
64 An Act Relating to Habeas Corpus, and Regulating Judicial Procedure in Certain Cas-
es, ch. 81, § 1, 12 Stat. 755. At this time, President Lincoln had already been detaining 
thousands of prisoners on suspicion of disloyalty since the beginning of the Civil War. Ty-
ler, supra note 47, at 638. 
65 An Act Relating to Habeas Corpus, and Regulating Judicial Procedure in Certain Cas-
es, ch. 81, § 2, 12 Stat. at 755. 
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prisoners were held.66 Moreover, the Act provided that prisoners were 
to be discharged if a court having jurisdiction over the prisoner con-
vened a grand jury and failed to indict the prisoner.67 An order for dis-
charge was enforceable against any officer of the United States and a 
delay or refusal of discharge was punishable under the discretion of the 
court.68 This built-in review suggests that Congress was concerned 
about prisoners being held indefinitely without sufficient grounds to 
bring charges against them.69 These safeguards suggest a reluctance to 
grant broad powers to the executive branch and a refusal to eliminate 
checks and balances altogether, even amid a grant of suspension power 
to the executive.70 
 In the middle of a rebellion, the courts never challenged this con-
gressional grant of suspension power to the executive, although the text 
of the Suspension Clause does not explicitly state whether Congress has 
the authority to grant its suspension powers to another branch.71 In 
1819, the U.S. Supreme Court in M’Culloch v. Maryland stated that Con-
gress could authorize the Executive to suspend habeas corpus.72 Chief 
Justice Marshall, writing for the majority, held that Congress must be 
granted the discretion to perform its duties in a manner which benefits 
the people, without being unnecessarily restrained by the courts.73 With 
an ongoing civil war, Congress’s Act of March 3, 1863 was likely to be 
                                                                                                                      
66 Id. 
67 Id. The Act specified that where a grand jury attended any of the courts having ju-
risdiction and ended its session without finding an indictment or presentment, or other 
proceeding against the prisoner, it was the duty of the judge in that court to order the 
prisoner before the court. Id. Once brought before the court, it was then the judge’s duty 
to discharge the prisoner from imprisonment. Id. No exact time-table was given for this 
safeguard other than the requirement that once a grand jury session was held, any prison-
ers against whom an indictment had not been obtained when the session terminated were 
to be discharged. See id. This could suggest Congress’s belief that once a grand jury could 
be convened, the exigencies of war no longer weighed heavily enough to eliminate the 
due process that habeas corpus provides. See id. 
68 Id. Refusal to comply with an order to discharge the prisoner was punishable as a mis-
demeanor, with a penalty of a “fine not less than five hundred dollars and imprisonment in 
the common jail for a period not less than six months, in the discretion of the court.” Id. 
69 See id. 
70 See id. This idea echoes Chief Justice Taney’s concerns in Ex parte Merryman. See 17 F. 
Cas. at 148. 
71 U.S. Const., art. I, § 9, cl. 2. 
72 17 U.S. (4 Wheat) 316, 421 (1819). If a challenge had emerged during the Civil War, 
the courts may have cited Chief Justice Marshall’s opinion in M’Culloch as evidence that 
Congress was well within its power to authorize such a suspension. See id. 
73 See id. 
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considered an example of this kind of discretion.74 There may, however, 
be circumstances which may not meet the meaning of rebellion or inva-
sion and might spur courts to consider whether the suspension was “le-
gitimate” and “within the scope of the constitution.”75 In these circum-
stances, courts may draw upon a standard of review that parallels the 
one used to review the war powers, given the review of war powers ac-
tions by previous Supreme Courts, or examples of courts reigning in 
congressional discretion by protecting individual rights.76 
 In 1946 the U.S. Supreme Court heard Duncan v. Kahanamoku and 
considered the question of what degree of deference should be af-
forded to the political branches when exercising war powers, namely 
the decision to declare martial law.77 The case centered upon a Hawai-
ian law that authorized the Governor of Hawaii to suspend the writ of 
habeas corpus in case of actual or threatened rebellion or invasion 
when the public safety required it, as well as ask for military aid and 
establish military tribunals under certain circumstances.78 Following 
the attacks on Pearl Harbor in 1941, the Governor exercised this power 
and also created military tribunals to take the place of the courts in cer-
tain areas.79 These tribunals operated outside the rules of evidence and 
procedure of civilian courts.80 Lloyd C. Duncan was a civilian shipfitter 
working in a Navy yard in Honolulu in 1944 when he got in a fight with 
two Marines at the yard.81 Civilian courts were still forbidden from try-
                                                                                                                      
74 See An Act Relating to Habeas Corpus, and Regulating Judicial Procedure in Certain 
Cases, ch. 81, § 1, 12 Stat. 755, 755 (1863); M’Culloch, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat) at 421. The Act 
Relating to Habeas Corpus explicitly referred to the ongoing rebellion and stated that the 
suspension would continue so long as the President deemed it necessary and the rebellion 
continued. See Act Relating to Habeas Corpus, and Regulating Judicial Procedure in Certain 
Cases, ch. 81, § 1, 12 Stat. at 755. 
75 Ex parte Merryman, 17 U.S. at 421. 
76 Tyler, supra note 4, at 409. 
77 See 327 U.S. at 318–19. Duncan can be viewed as both a deferential case, given its ex-
planation of the typical standard that should be applied to acts like suspension or martial 
law, as well as a more searching standard of review case. See id. Interpreting Duncan’s ap-
proach as applying strict scrutiny is discussed below. See infra notes 97–102 and accompany-
ing text. 
78 Duncan, 327 U.S. at 315; see Hawaii Organic Act, ch. 339, § 67, 31 Stat. 141 (1900). 
At the time of the case, suspension of habeas corpus was not in effect, but civilian courts 
were bypassed by military tribunals. See Duncan, 327 U.S. at 312. 
79 Duncan, 327 U.S. at 308. 
80 Id. 
81 Id. at 310. This case was appealed to the Supreme Court along with a companion 
case, White v. Steer, 146 F.2d 576 (9th Cir. 1944). Harry E. White was a stockbroker in Hono-
lulu who was arrested by military police and charged with embezzling stocks in August of 
1942. Duncan, 327 U.S. at 309–10. White was sentenced before a military tribunal and sub-
sequently challenged the power of the military tribunal to try him. Id. at 310. 
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ing criminal prosecutions for violations of military orders more than 
two years after the attacks on Pearl Harbor, and Duncan was sentenced 
to prison by military tribunal.82 Duncan challenged the power of the 
military tribunal to try him by filing a writ of habeas corpus in the U.S. 
District Court for the District of Hawaii.83 On appeal to the Supreme 
Court, the government conceded that suspension of habeas corpus was 
not still in effect, yet argued military tribunals had been authorized by 
Congress in section 67, chapter 339 of the Hawaii Organic Act.84 
 The Court concluded that Congress did not intend section 67 to 
subject civilians to military orders and trial by military tribunal, despite 
acknowledgment that the executive is typically given broad deference in 
the exercise of war powers.85 Section 67, the Court reasoned, was only 
intended to authorize actions to maintain order and provide for defense 
amid an “actual or threatened rebellion or invasion,” and was never 
meant to circumvent the courts by military tribunals for longer than cir-
cumstances required.86 Justice Stone, concurring, acknowledged that 
the executive branch generally has broad discretion to determine when 
the public safety is endangered to a degree which requires the imposi-
tion of martial law and using it to meet the current needs.87 Justice 
Stone underscored the majority’s conclusion by emphasizing that the 
Court’s review was focused not on the executive’s decision that sufficient 
exigencies existed to declare martial law, but on the military’s judgment 
that its actions were within the bounds of martial law.88 
 The view in Duncan that the political branches should be accorded 
deferential scrutiny in the exercise of war powers, or other discretion-
ary measures during exigent circumstances, has deep roots in prece-
dent.89 Although expressing the view that these cases should be subject 
to judicial review, commentators have noted that the review has gravi-
tated towards a deferential standard that grants “extraordinary” defer-
ence to the political branches in light of the delicate nature of matters 
                                                                                                                      
82 Duncan, 327 U.S. at 310–11. 
83 Id. at 311. 
84 Id. at 312. 
85 See id. at 324. 
86 Id. 
87 See id. at 335 (Stone, J., concurring). 
88 Duncan, 327 U.S. at 335 (Stone, J., concurring). 
89 Rachel E. Barkow, More Supreme Than Court? The Fall of the Political Question and the 
Rise of Judicial Supremacy, 102 Colum. L. Rev. 237, 241–42 (2002); see Duncan, 327 U.S. at 
335 (Stone, J., concurring). 
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like national security, foreign affairs, and political issues.90 As previously 
noted, the Court in M’Culloch was clearly concerned about the judicial 
branch overstepping its bounds in reviewing the “necessity” of actions 
taken under the Necessary and Proper Clause of the Constitution.91 
The Court refused to determine whether a national bank was “neces-
sary and proper” under Section 9 of Article I of the Constitution since 
the analysis looked like second-guessing of the political branches.92 
Fearing this would lead them to “tread on legislative ground,” the 
Court focused not on whether the proper degree of necessity was met, 
but rather on whether Congress had the power in general.93 Finding 
that they did, the Court inquired no further.94 
 The Court in Luther v. Borden addressed a more complex separation 
of powers issue, but came to a similar conclusion regarding deference to 
the political branches.95 The Court pointed to the Constitution, which 
authorizes Congress to decide the established government in a state.96 
The Court went on to consider the power of the Executive to call on the 
militia to suppress an insurrection when the President deems a crisis 
exists that merits this action.97 It determined that because Congress had 
given the President the sole authority to determine whether such exi-
gencies existed, the President had the authority to determine which 
government was effective.98 Once the political branches had deter-
mined which state government was valid, the courts had no role in re-
viewing the decision.99 To do so, Justice Taney reasoned, would be to 
interpret the Constitution as guaranteeing anarchy instead of order.100 
                                                                                                                      
90 See Robert J. Pushaw, Jr., Judicial Review and the Political Question: Reviving the Federalist 
“Rebuttable Presumption” Analysis, 80 N.C. L. Rev. 1165, 1199 (2002). 
91 See 17 U.S. (4 Wheat) at 423. 
92 U.S. Const., art. I, § 9; see M’Culloch, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat) at 423. 
93 See M’Culloch, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat) at 423. This idea is likely what a court primarily would 
rely upon in the event the court applied a deferential standard of review: a refusal to engage 
in the strict scrutiny approach that questions whether circumstances specifically warrant the 
exercise of a power that has been granted to the government by the Constitution. See id. 
94 See id. 
95 48 U.S. 1, 42 (1849); see Pushaw, supra note 90, at 1193–94. The case involved a dis-
pute in Rhode Island, beginning in 1841 with the ratification of a new state constitution, as 
to whether the new state constitution or the old royal charter from colonial days consti-
tuted the effective government of the state. Luther, 48 U.S. at 36–38. 
96 U.S. Const., art. IV, § 4; Luther, 48 U.S. at 36–38. Congress never had the opportu-
nity to make this decision because Rhode Island resolved the dispute before the matter 
reached the federal level. Luther, 48 U.S. at 36–38. 
97 Luther, 48 U.S. at 36–38. 
98 Id. at 42. 
99 See id. 
100 Id. 
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B. A More Searching Review: Viewing Habeas Corpus in the  
Light of Individual Liberty 
 Although these cases provide compelling reasons for a deferential 
standard of review should Congress determine that a rebellion or inva-
sion merits suspension, others have suggested that the importance of 
the writ of habeas corpus in ensuring individual liberty supports a strict 
standard of review.101 This approach reflects the idea that actions by the 
government that infringe upon fundamental rights granted by the 
Constitution require the courts to exercise a searching standard of re-
view in order to serve the judicial branch’s role in the checks and bal-
ances of the government.102 To a degree, the same cases in which courts 
express a desire to defer to the discretion of the political branches of-
ten express reluctance to let individual liberty be impinged without ju-
dicial review.103 The courts, however, have at times expressed hesitancy 
with giving a clear delegation of power to the political branches, be-
cause an act like suspension, or the imposition of martial law as dis-
cussed in Duncan, would be a drastic departure from our political tradi-
tions so as to warrant searching judicial review.104 
 The Court in Duncan undertook a searching review of the imposi-
tion of martial law in Hawaii, scrutinizing section 67 of the Hawaii Or-
ganic Act and the extent to which the statute intended to permit martial 
law.105 The Court was concerned with balancing the exigencies of war 
with the constitutional guarantee of a fair trial for all citizens and re-
fused to uphold the military trials of the petitioners.106 The Court noted 
the historical reluctance of the American people to place the execution 
of the law solely within the hands of the military, without the oversight 
of the judicial courts.107 For example, the Court pointed to the use of 
                                                                                                                      
101 See Tyler, supra note 4, at 411–12. 
102 Id. at 411. 
103 See Boumediene v. Bush, 128 S. Ct. 2229, 2275 (2008); Duncan, 327 U.S. at 317; Ex 
parte Merryman, 17 F. Cas. at 148. 
104 See Boumediene, 128 S. Ct. at 2275; Duncan, 327 U.S. at 317; Ex parte Merryman, 17 F. 
Cas. at 148. 
105 Duncan, 327 U.S. at 314–15; see Hawaii Organic Act, Ch. 339, § 67, 31 Stat. 141 (1900). 
106 See Duncan, 327 U.S. at 318. 
107 See id. at 319–21. The Court referenced the American Revolution in light of its re-
bellion against a government that attempted to place the military in a superior position of 
authority to the civil power. Id. at 320. The Court referred to the instructions given by the 
Governor of Massachusetts to troops intervening during Shay’s Rebellion in 1787, which 
specified the military was to “‘protect the judicial courts . . . ,’ ‘to assist the civil magistrates 
in executing the laws . . . ,’ and to ‘aid them in apprehending the disturbers.’” Id. The 
military commanders were to consider themselves completely and constantly under the 
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the militia in 1787 during Shay’s rebellion and in 1794 during the Whis-
key Rebellion, underscoring that the use of troops was never meant to 
supplant the civilian authorities.108 Courts provide procedural safe-
guards that play a crucial role in the government, put in the Constitu-
tion to protect liberties valued by the founders.109 Although the Court 
did not consider the use of military tribunals in civilian cases to be a 
suspension, it is noteworthy that the Court used a searching review in 
determining the degree of deference that should be granted when a 
government action drastically curtailed individual rights.110 
 The Court in Duncan drew upon precedent such as Ex parte 
Milligan, a U.S. Supreme Court case from 1866 involving a habeas cor-
pus petition.111 In Ex parte Milligan, a prisoner filed a petition of habeas 
corpus following the Civil War after he was arrested by military forces, 
detained in a military prison in Indiana, and sentenced to death by a 
military commission.112 The prisoner argued that the military commis-
sion had no jurisdiction over him because he was residing in a state that 
was not in rebellion.113 The Court held that the military commission 
did not have jurisdiction and noted that the necessary exigencies must 
exist for the imposition of martial law.114 Martial law must arise not 
from a threatened rebellion or invasion, but rather from an “actual and 
present” threat that closes off the courts and leaves the civil authorities 
unable to perform their duties.115 The Court made it clear that there 
are situations where martial law is appropriate and it was courts’ duty to 
review whether the circumstances actually existed and whether martial 
law was confined to the locality of actual war.116 Therefore, in the event 
a rebellion or invasion takes place, martial law could be needed in one 
state, yet in another it would lead to mere lawless violence.117 The opin-
ion concluded that these powers are more likely to be abused by the 
government than the power to regulate commerce or borrow money, 
and, therefore, the Court was unwilling to give assent by silence when 
                                                                                                                      
direction of civil authorities unless opposed by armed forces. Id. Similar instructions were 
given by President Washington during the Whiskey Rebellion in 1794. Id. at 321. 
108 See id. at 320–21. Justice Murphy, in his concurrence, noted that “[a]bhorrence of 
military rule is ingrained in our form of government.” Id. at 325 (Murphy, J., concurring). 
109 Id. at 322 (majority opinion). 
110 See id. at 324. 
111 Ex parte Milligan, 71 U.S. 2, 107 (1866). 
112 Id. 
113 Id. at 108. 
114 See id. at 126–27. 
115 Id. at 127. 
116 Id. 
117 Ex parte Milligan, 71 U.S. at 127. 
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the risks of misapplication were higher than those involved with other 
powers.118 
 The need for a searching review of a suspension of habeas corpus 
also stems from the lasting legacy of cases where the courts deferred to 
the judgment of the political branches during times of war.119 Past injus-
tices, such as the internment of Japanese-American citizens, serve as a 
poignant reminder of how judicial deference to the judgments of mili-
tary commanders can lead to serious consequences.120 When the courts 
refuse to address whether the necessity exists to invoke a suspension of 
habeas corpus, they effectively leave a constitutional issue to a nonjudi-
cial resolution, and allow the political branches to limit individual lib-
erty as they see fit.121 A decision to defer to the political branches may be 
easier during conflict, but it becomes less defensible as time goes on.122 
It is not unreasonable to predict that precedents like the internment of 
Japanese-American citizens could be applied to the war on terror in de-
ferring to a suspension of habeas corpus amid the dangers of a future 
terrorist attack.123 
                                                                                                                      
118 Id. at 141–42. The Court stated it was “unwilling to give [its] assent by silence to ex-
pressions of opinion” that seemed likely to result, even unintentionally, in an erosion of 
the constitutional powers of the government and an increase in the danger to the public 
during already dangerous circumstances. Id. at 142. 
119 See, e.g., Michael Stokes Paulsen, The Constitution of Necessity, 79 Notre Dame L. Rev. 
1257, 1294 (2004). 
120 See Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 223–24 (1944) (affirming appellant’s 
conviction for remaining in a “Military Area” contrary to a military order which directed 
that all persons of Japanese ancestry be excluded from such area); Hirabayashi v. United 
States, 320 U.S. 81, 104–05 (1943) (affirming appellant’s conviction for knowingly disre-
garding a curfew order imposed by military commanders on persons of Japanese descent 
in prescribed military areas); Paulsen, supra note 119, at 1294; Tyler, supra note 4, at 410–
11. Justice Murphy, in his dissent in Korematsu, underlined the fact that in dealing with a 
war, a court must give great respect and consideration to the judgment of military authori-
ties, given that the court is ill-equiped to second-guess their decisions. 323 U.S. at 233–34 
(Murphy, J., dissenting). Justice Murphy went on to elaborate, however, that the discretion 
granted to the military must have definite limits, preventing individuals from having their 
constitutional rights violated because the military claims necessity that has no substance or 
support. Id. at 234. 
121 Tyler, supra note 4, at 410 (quoting J. Peter Mulhern, In Defense of the Political Ques-
tion Doctrine, 137 U. Pa. L. Rev. 97, 146 (1988)). 
122 See Korematsu, 323 U.S. at 223–24; Tyler, supra note 4, at 410 (quoting Mulhern, su-
pra note 121, at 146). 
123 Bruce Ackerman, The Emergency Constitution, 113 Yale L.J. 1029, 1043 (2004). 
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C. The War on Terror: Majorities, Pluralities, Dissents, and a Lack of 
Consensus on a Standard 
 The specter of the war on terror has renewed the importance of 
discussing judicial review of a possible suspension of habeas corpus.124 
The nation has not experienced a suspension of habeas corpus arising 
out of the war on terror, yet current cases have hinted at whether such 
an act would be reviewable and to what extent.125 Whether or not the 
war on terror cases can be viewed as advocating a role for the courts in 
the event of a suspension is debatable, but they provide insight into the 
role of the courts and how a suspension of habeas corpus may arise to-
day.126 Specifically, both Hamdi v. Rumsfeld in 2004 and Boumediene v. 
Bush in 2008 are noteworthy cases in this area because they contain sup-
port for both a deferential standard and a more searching standard.127 
 Yaser Esam Hamdi was captured in 2001 by the Northern Alliance 
in Afghanistan and turned over to the U.S. military, who transferred 
him to the U.S. naval base in Guantanamo Bay, Cuba in early 2002.128 
Upon learning that he was an American citizen, the military trans-
ferred Hamdi to a naval brig in Norfolk, Virgina and later to a brig in 
Charleston, South Carolina.129 Hamdi’s father filed a habeas petition 
on his behalf under 28 U.S.C. § 2241.130 He challenged the legality of 
the detention of a U.S. citizen as an “enemy combatant” and the due 
process owed to this kind of prisoner.131 The U.S. Supreme Court held 
that even though Congress had authorized the detention of combatants 
in certain circumstances, Hamdi had not been granted the due process 
required under the law.132 
 The majority in Hamdi noted that it has only been in rare circum-
stances that Congress has decided it was appropriate to suspend the 
                                                                                                                      
124 Tyler, supra note 4, at 335. 
125 See Boumediene, 128 S. Ct. at 2263; Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 525 (2004). 
126 See Tyler, supra note 4, at 338. 
127 Boumediene, 128 S. Ct. at 2263; Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 525. 
128 Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 510. 
129 Id. 
130 Id. at 511. 
131 Id. at 509; see Authorization for Use of Military Force, Pub. L. No. 107-40, 115 Stat. 
224 (2001). 
132 Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 538. Specifically, the Court found that despite the powers granted 
under the Authorization for Use of Military Force (“AUMF”), due process requires that a 
U.S. citizen held within the United States as an enemy combatant be given a “meaningful 
opportunity” to argue against the basis for his characterization as an enemy combatant be-
fore a neutral judge or other decisionmaker. Authorization for Use of Military Force, 115 
Stat. at 224; Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 535–39. 
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writ.133 Absent a suspension, the writ remains in place as a check on the 
executive to ensure that individuals are only detained according to the 
law.134 Although this does not provide much of a basis for furthering the 
analysis of judicial review of suspension, Justice Scalia provided further 
ideas in his dissent.135 Justice Scalia began by noting that the exigencies 
of war, such as threats posed to civilians and widespread conflict, may 
prevent a citizen accused of wrongful actions by the government from 
receiving full due process.136 To enable this, the Suspension Clause al-
lows Congress to authorize the usual protections to be suspended tem-
porarily in the interest of public safety.137 Justice Scalia’s dissent, citing 
Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, noted that the Suspension Clause 
was designed to be a safety valve, allowing for suspension, “but limiting 
the situations in which it may be invoked.”138 Although Justice Scalia 
noted that suspension is limited by the Constitution to cases of rebellion 
or invasion, he asserted that whether events like the September 11, 2001 
terrorist attacks qualify as an “invasion” is a question for the legislature, 
not the courts.139 Justice Scalia also noted that whether an attack merits 
suspension several years later is a question for Congress.140 This deci-
sion, Justice Scalia reasoned, must be done openly and democratically 
rather than through the judicial branch.141 
 Judicial review of a suspension of habeas corpus arose again, albeit 
indirectly, in the Supreme Court’s decision of Boumediene in 2008.142 
The appeal came before the U.S. Supreme Court as consolidated cases 
brought by foreign nationals detained as enemy combatants at the U.S. 
naval base in Guantanamo Bay, Cuba.143 The central issue was whether 
the writ of habeas corpus was in force at the Guantanamo Bay base.144 If 
the writ was in force at Guantanamo, the next question was whether the 
Military Commissions Act (“MCA”) provided an adequate substitute for 
                                                                                                                      
133 Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 525. Although the case presented a number of important issues, 
including the power of the executive to detain citizens as “enemy combatants,” the case is 
only relevant to this discussion for its views on the possibility of suspension. Id. 
134 Id. 
135 Id. at 554 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
136 See id. 
137 Id. 
138 Id. at 562 (citing Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 650 (1952) 
( Jackson, J., concurring)). 
139 Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 578 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
140 Id. 
141 Id. 
142 See 128 S. Ct. at 2271. 
143 Id. at 2240. 
144 Id. 
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the procedures granted by habeas corpus in light of the fact that the 
MCA denies federal courts jurisdiction to hear habeas corpus actions by 
enemy combatants held there.145 The Court determined the Suspen-
sion Clause has full effect at Guantanamo Bay.146 These issues were cru-
cial to the case, but Boumediene is most useful in this discussion for its 
consideration of suspension of habeas corpus arising out of the war on 
terror.147 
 Justice Kennedy, writing for the majority, stated that prior case law 
does not contain extensive analysis of standards that define appropriate 
suspension of the writ or full descriptions of circumstances under 
which the writ has been suspended.148 The Court interpreted this am-
biguity to reflect the fact that Congress has taken care throughout his-
tory to ensure that the writ and its function of guarding individual lib-
erty is protected, noting that the majority of the statutes passed 
regarding habeas corpus have strengthened, rather than limited, it.149 
The Court noted that there was a lack of prudential barriers to review 
habeas corpus under the circumstances, concluding that the jurisdic-
tional bar of habeas corpus claims by the detainees was unconstitu-
                                                                                                                      
145 Id. 
146 Id. at 2262. The Court determined that the Suspension Clause has full effect at 
Guantanamo Bay, noting that the individuals were detained by executive order during 
what is now the longest military conflict in the nation’s history and held in a territory “un-
der the complete and total control of our Government.” Id. Addressing the issues of 
whether the writ travels to that geographical location and to foreign nationals being de-
tained there is outside the scope of this Note. Moreover, the Court’s discussion of “the 
requisites for an adequate substitute for habeas corpus” is also outside the scope of this 
Note, although the Court’s decision to engage in a searching judicial review of whether 
the MCA was an adequate substitute may suggest something about their willingness to 
review suspension issues. See id. 
147 See id. at 2275. The Court held that the MCA § 7 amounted to an unconstitutional 
suspension of the writ in light of the fact that by retroactively applying the Detainee 
Treatment Act (“DTA”), the detainee’s did not have access to adequate statutory review 
through the appeal process upon a decision by a Combat Status Review Tribunal (“CSRT”) 
due to the length of time necessary to obtain review. Id. at 2266. The Court noted that 
“[b]y foreclosing consideration of evidence not presented or reasonably available to the 
detainee at the CSRT proceedings, the DTA disadvantages the detainee by limiting the 
scope of collateral review to a record that may not be accurate or complete.” Id. at 2273. 
This was especially important in a setting where “the underlying detention proceedings 
lack the necessary adversarial character.” Id. 
148 Boumediene, 128 S. Ct. at 2263. 
149 Id.; cf. Harris v. Nelson, 394 U.S. 286, 299–300 (1969) (interpreting the All Writs 
Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1651 (2006) to allow discovery in habeas corpus proceedings); Peyton v. 
Rowe, 391 U.S. 54, 64–65 (1968) (interpreting the then-existing version of 28 U.S.C. 
§ 2241 to allow petitioner to proceed with his habeas corpus action, even though he had 
not yet begun to serve his sentence). 
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tional.150 The Court differentiated between situations where a prisoner 
had just been captured and the one at hand, where detainees had been 
held for up to six years without the right to habeas corpus or a judi-
cially-adequate substitute.151 Given the amount of time that had passed, 
the Court could find no justification for deeming temporary proce-
dures adequate.152 
 The constant and unabated nature of terrorist attacks likely influ-
enced the Court’s refusal to allow prudential considerations to bar re-
view for a long period of time.153 The Court noted that, despite the na-
ture of the threat of terrorism, practical considerations must be made 
in determining whether the necessary exigent circumstances exist.154 
The fact that this threat would not likely subside had to be viewed 
alongside the fact that some of the cases on appeal had been without 
the judicial oversight that habeas corpus provides for over six years.155 
This length of time meant the threat of terrorist attacks did not out-
weigh the practicality of making the detainees wait even longer to pre-
sent their case before a neutral decisionmaker.156 
 Justice Scalia, writing a separate dissent in Boumediene, discussed 
the dangers terrorism poses to the nation and the difficulty the nation 
faces in protecting itself from these acts.157 The Court’s decision, Justice 
Scalia reasoned, leaves military commanders with an impossible task: 
proving to a court of civilians, under unknown standards yet to be de-
termined by the Court, that the evidence supports the detention of 
every prisoner the United States captures in the war on terror.158 Justice 
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Scalia noted that the Court, in deciding that the writ traveled to Guan-
tanamo Bay, broke with strong precedent, including the common law 
prohibition of judicial review of aliens detained abroad in circum-
stances lacking statutory authorization.159 This deferential stance to the 
political branches emphasized the difficulties the nation faces in wag-
ing a war on terror and the need to give the political branches the nec-
essary deference in determining how best to combat the threat.160 
III. A Fork in the Road: Weighing War’s Exigencies Against  
the Liberty of Individuals 
 Two competing views on judicial review of habeas corpus arise from 
statutes, cases, and commentators.161 On one hand, strong support ex-
ists for viewing a suspension of habeas corpus similar to an exercise of 
the war powers, warranting deference to the political branches.162 This 
approach places a suspension along the lines of the imposition of mar-
tial law during an extreme circumstance and underscores the need for 
the political branches to have flexibility during dangerous times.163 The 
result would be a limited review that would only correct the most un-
founded interpretations of the Suspension Clause by Congress.164 
 On the other hand, the role of habeas corpus in preserving fun-
damental individual rights may influence a court to play a larger role in 
reviewing a suspension of habeas corpus.165 A court may reason that 
habeas corpus holds importance and value, chiefly the ability to ques-
tion the basis of one’s detention, and that its suspension should be af-
forded more review.166 Review may be important even during trying 
circumstances.167 The result would be a more searching judicial review 
which would question whether a rebellion or invasion exists and, if so, 
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whether the public safety requires that habeas corpus be suspended.168 
Then again, a court may find itself drawn to a middle ground that ex-
amines the indefinite nature of the suspension and whether the courts 
are truly inaccessible, especially if the court has to make a decision 
amidst extreme controversy.169 
 The circumstances surrounding a suspension of habeas corpus 
could play a major role in determining what standard a court would ap-
ply.170 A series of fact patterns can be used to shed light on how an analy-
sis might be shaped.171 The first fact pattern explores the courts’ role in 
reviewing a traditional exercise of the Suspension Clause by Congress 
amid an invasion from a foreign nation.172 The second fact pattern ex-
amines how the court might have reacted if Congress had suspended 
the writ of habeas corpus following the terrorist attacks of September 
11, 2001.173 The last fact pattern explores how the analysis might change 
if a suspension dragged on for a significant period of time.174 
A. Traditional Deference Amid Rebellion or Invasion 
 A suspension of the writ of habeas corpus has historically occurred 
under circumstances that easily meet the definition of a rebellion or 
invasion, and a court today could find itself faced with a similar circum-
stance.175 Suppose, for example, that the nation faces not just a threat-
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ened invasion, but an actual invasion by a foreign country.176 Foreign 
troops are on American soil and Congress passes a statute authorizing 
the President to suspend habeas corpus whenever the public safety re-
quires it in a state that has been invaded or threatened by invasion.177 
The President, in turn, authorizes the military to hold anyone arrested 
by American forces within such a jurisdiction without affording them 
the opportunity to present their case before a civilian court or to peti-
tion a court for the writ of habeas corpus.178 This authorization, how-
ever, comes with certain limitations imposed by Congress, similar to 
limitations found in the suspension passed during the Civil War, requir-
ing the military to provide to circuit and district courts the names and 
dates of arrest of those detained.179 A limited form of judicial review is 
built into the suspension by requiring a court in session with jurisdic-
tion over a prisoner to convene a grand jury to indict the prisoner.180 
Failure to obtain an indictment would lead to an order to discharge the 
prisoner.181 
 Following this suspension of habeas corpus, suppose an American 
citizen is arrested for looting in a state which borders a state actively 
involved in conflict, yet is not itself currently occupied by any enemy 
forces.182 The looter’s state, however, is in disarray due to the perceived 
threat by many that enemy troops could enter the state at any time.183 
The citizen is held by military forces without the right to protest his de-
tainment.184 Based upon these circumstances, a court decides to hear a 
petition for habeas corpus due to the citizen’s challenge that Congress 
does not have the authority to suspend habeas corpus in a state which is 
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not actually being invaded by enemy troops.185 The court is faced with 
the dilemma of whether it should apply a deferential standard of review 
in light of the circumstances, or apply a more searching review in light 
of the fact that an American citizen is being held without the right to 
challenge his detention.186 
 The argument for a deferential standard has strong precedent sup-
porting it, such as the Court’s view in Ex parte Bollman that the legisla-
ture is to decide whether the public safety requires the suspension of 
habeas corpus.187 Under this view, Congress would be viewed as having 
full authority to decide whether the writ should be suspended.188 So 
long as the government could point towards some circumstances which 
they deem to meet the definition of an invasion or rebellion, the court 
would not question Congress’s judgment.189 This is based upon the no-
tion that the political branches should be accorded deferential scrutiny 
during times of war.190 Much like the war powers, the Constitution al-
lows the political branches to exercise their judgment during conflict in 
order to ensure the nation’s safety.191 Applied to this fact pattern, under 
a deferential approach, the court would not inquire into whether sus-
pension of habeas corpus was appropriate in the state that was only 
threatened with invasion.192 The decision to suspend the writ is, accord-
ing to this view, clearly delegated to the political branches in order to 
ensure that a suspension is done in an open and democratic manner.193 
Because Congress determined that the threat of invasion was great 
enough to suspend the writ, even in states that had not actually been 
invaded yet, the court would not review whether this decision was cor-
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rect.194 This is in contrast with an approach that focuses on habeas cor-
pus’ value in protecting individual liberties.195 
 In 1946, the U.S. Supreme Court in Duncan v. Kahanamoku recog-
nized that the political branches are typically granted deference when 
deciding issues such as the exercise of war powers, yet there still may be 
a need for judicial review of these decisions.196 A court, influenced by 
that decision, may inquire into whether Congress truly intended to sus-
pend the writ in a state that had not been invaded.197 A court may be 
spurred to apply a more searching judicial review by focusing on the 
idea that suspension is authorized only if the circumstances warrant it, 
and if it ignored this premise, it would allow the political branches to 
suspend the writ wherever they deemed fit.198 Under this approach, a 
court would be less deferential and could find that Congress did not 
intend to authorize a suspension in this case.199 
 In light of the circumstances, it is likely that a court would adopt a 
view similar to Justice Marshall’s in Ex parte Bollman and apply a defer-
ential standard to whether the suspension was appropriate.200 Faced 
with an invading army on American soil, the political branches would 
be too restricted by the courts if the courts were to scrutinize the deci-
sion to suspend the writ.201 Moreover, a broad suspension arising di-
rectly out of a conflict would make it hard for a court to argue that the 
suspension, as applied, was not what Congress intended.202 The Sus-
pension Clause was designed to provide Congress with the means for 
suspending the writ of habeas corpus in a situation like war, when it is 
unrealistic to expect the government to be able to afford individuals 
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full due process under the law.203 The application of a deferential re-
view, however, seems predicated upon a court’s interpretation of the 
circumstances surrounding the suspension itself, or at minimum, the 
assurance that suspension is a temporary solution.204 
B. A New World: The War on Terror and Its Lessons 
 Following the events of September 11, 2001, some commentators 
have suggested that the Bush administration made requests to Congress 
to suspend the writ of habeas corpus.205 The administration could have 
been successful in this effort, given the circumstances at the time, even 
if they did not in fact make such a request.206 The Suspension Clause 
can be viewed as a safety valve that enables Congress to limit the due 
process granted to detainees when the exigencies of a conflict would 
make it too burdensome.207 The events of September 11, 2001 provided 
a compelling argument that such exigencies existed given the gravity 
and harm of the attacks.208 In fact, the statutes passed to deal with de-
tainees in the war on terror and the ensuing litigation surrounding 
them provide a basis for examining what a suspension of habeas corpus 
might have looked like if it had come to pass.209 
 The Authorization for Use of Military Force (“AUMF”) passed 
shortly after September 11, 2001, and gave the President the authority 
to use necessary force against any person determined to have “planned, 
authorized, committed, or aided the terrorist attacks.”210 Suppose that 
instead of only authorizing military force, the AUMF had also author-
ized the President to suspend the writ of habeas corpus to all suspected 
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terrorists, described in the same manner as those who the AUMF au-
thorized the use of force against.211 This suspension would apply not 
only to known terrorists, but also those who the military suspected of 
involvement.212 Suppose following a suspension an American citizen, 
under circumstances similar to Yaser Esam Hamdi, is detained by mili-
tary forces and attempts to file a petition of habeas corpus.213 He al-
leges that the requirement of an invasion or rebellion has not been met 
and, therefore, the suspension of habeas corpus is invalid.214 This 
would present a court with a unique challenge, balancing the need for 
the political branches to be granted deference during a time of conflict 
while also protecting individual liberties.215 
 The arguments for applying a deferential standard to a congres-
sional suspension of the writ of habeas corpus following the September 
11, 2001 attacks are clearly stated in Justice Scalia’s dissent in Hamdi v. 
Rumsfeld.216 Justice Scalia argues that whether the terrorist attacks con-
stitute an “invasion” is for the legislature to decide.217 Applying this view 
to the attacks on September 11, there is a compelling argument that 
the court should defer to the judgment of the legislature on whether 
the requirements of the Suspension Clause have been met.218 If courts 
were to scrutinize this decision, the legislature would be hindered 
much like Justice Scalia argues the military is hindered following the 
decision in Boumediene v. Bush.219 During a time when the nation was 
recovering from a terrorist attack and bracing against the potential of 
future attacks, Justice Scalia’s argument would likely have significant 
weight in persuading courts that they should not engage in a searching 
judicial review to determine whether the terrorist attack constituted an 
invasion.220 
 There is historical precedent for the argument that an event like 
the September 11 attacks demands that courts step aside and respect 
the separation of powers between the political branches and the judici-
ary.221 In this situation, Congress has determined that the President 
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must have the discretion to detain suspected terrorists without entitling 
them to the writ of habeas corpus, a level of discretion similar to the 
grant of authority discussed in Luther v. Borden.222 As the Court ob-
served in Luther, these determinations may be necessary to maintain 
order and safety in the nation, and for the courts to second guess that 
determination would lead to “anarchy.”223 This reasoning led Chief Jus-
tice Taney in Ex parte Merryman to state in dicta that Congress’s judg-
ment in deciding whether suspension was appropriate would be con-
clusive, despite acknowledging the caution that should be exercised in 
taking that step.224 In light of the threat that the nation faced following 
September 11, 2001, this precedent would make it difficult for a court 
to apply a more searching standard of judicial review given the high 
risk that second-guessing the political branches could place the nation 
in greater danger, stripping the nation of the tools it needs to defend 
itself.225 
 There are arguments, however, that support a more searching ju-
dicial review in light of the value of habeas corpus in protecting a per-
son’s fundamental right to protest his or her confinement.226 A court 
may reason that it should review whether Congress can grant broad 
powers to the executive given that the threat from terrorism is ambigu-
ous: the likelihood of an attack is difficult to determine.227 The issue, 
however, is whether a court would find fault with Congress’s suspension 
when it is narrowly focused on known and suspected terrorists.228 Al-
though the statute in Duncan was passed years before the executive ac-
tion took place in Hawaii, here the statute in question would have been 
tailor-made to the circumstances.229 A court, therefore, would have a 
difficult time scrutinizing the statute; although one could argue, as the 
Court did in Ex parte Milligan, that a threat must be actual and present 
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rather than simply threatened.230 Given this requirement, a court could 
be compelled to apply a more searching judicial review of whether the 
attacks of September 11 truly constituted an invasion and whether the 
threat of invasion continued afterwards.231 
 Overall, there is powerful precedent supporting a conclusive 
judgment by Congress in determining whether the requisite circum-
stances exist for a suspension of habeas corpus immediately following a 
terrorist attack.232 Theoretically, this precedent creates a safety valve, 
similar to the Suspension Clause itself, for the courts to use in the event 
the political branches require deference amid an emergency.233 This 
provides a strong argument that a court would have applied a deferen-
tial standard of review following a suspension of habeas corpus in the 
wake of the September 11 attacks—the suspension in this case would be 
supported by a clear threat and, given its timing, be immune to criti-
cism that it results in indefinite detainment.234 This result, however, 
would place individual liberties in the hands of the political branches 
alone, with trust that the democratic process will ensure that the right 
decisions are made.235 The level of deference is similar to that granted 
in the Japanese-American internment cases during World War II.236 
Amid the exigencies of a war, these steps may be supported by the pub-
lic.237 Regardless of how these actions would be viewed in retrospect, 
there is strong evidence suggesting that a court would be well-
grounded, both in case law and public opinion, in granting deference 
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to the political branches as to whether the attacks of September 11 con-
stituted an invasion or rebellion.238 
C. Questions of Timing: How Long Can Exigencies Exist? 
 The exploration of a hypothetical suspension of habeas corpus 
immediately following the attacks of September 11, 2001 suggests a lim-
ited role for the courts in reviewing whether a suspension was appro-
priate.239 Suppose, however, that this suspension did not only span the 
weeks or months following the terrorist attacks, but went on for 
years.240 The recent decision in Boumediene, holding Combatant Status 
Review Tribunal proceedings inadequate for suspected terrorists de-
tained by the U.S. government, makes it apparent that the war on ter-
ror creates threat and detention issues that continue for years.241 More-
over, the very nature of terrorism as a constant and unrelenting threat 
to the nation could lead the political branches to argue that the sus-
pension of habeas corpus is as necessary today as it was on September 
12, 2001.242 When the factor of time is added to the equation, a court’s 
role in reviewing a suspension may change.243 
 Suppose that the AUMF authorized the continued suspension of 
the writ of habeas corpus to all known and suspected terrorists in the 
years after the September 11 attacks.244 This long-standing suspension 
would likely have various checks built into it in an effort to establish 
some substitutes for the due process that habeas corpus affords, much 
like the suspension arising out of the Civil War and the recent MCA 
section 7.245 Substitutes like these, combined with the narrow scope of 
the suspension’s applicability, could result in the political branches al-
                                                                                                                      
238 See Boumediene, 128 S. Ct. at 2275. 
239 See id. 
240 See Ackerman¸ supra note 123, at 1070. 
241 See 128 S. Ct. at 2274–77 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
242 See id. at 2274–75. Justice Scalia reasoned in Boumediene that it is unrealistic to ex-
pect military commanders to produce evidence in civilian courts that supports the con-
finement of every enemy prisoner in the war on terror. Id. This “unique” attribute of ter-
rorism, as both an ambiguous and ever-present threat, makes it a likely candidate for an 
extended suspension of habeas corpus. See id. 
243 See id. at 2275; Ackerman, supra note 123, at 1070. 
244 See Authorization for Use of Military Force, Pub. L. No. 107-40, 115 Stat. 224 
(2001); Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 509; Tyler, supra note 4, at 334 (citing Alter, supra note 205, at 
48); Brill, supra note 205, at 73–74. 
245 See, e.g., Military Commissions Act of 2006 § 7, Pub. L. No. 109–366, 120 Stat. 2600 
(codified at scattered sections of 10, 18, 28, and 42 U.S.C.); An Act Relating to Habeas Cor-
pus, and Regulating Judicial Procedure in Certain Cases, ch. 81, § 1, 12 Stat. 755 (1863). 
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lowing the suspension to continue for quite some time.246 Suppose, for 
example, that a prisoner who is detained by the government since the 
enactment of the suspension in late 2001 challenges the validity of the 
suspension itself, arguing that sufficient exigencies no longer exist that 
justify the suspension of habeas corpus and they should be able to file a 
petition of habeas corpus to challenge the legality of their detention.247 
The basis of this argument would be that no terrorist attack has oc-
curred on U.S. soil since 2001 and the threat is no longer “actual and 
present,” but rather so diminished that it cannot justify a suspension.248 
A court would be forced to address whether it is appropriate to apply a 
searching judicial review to determine if the dangers of a rebellion or 
invasion still sufficiently exist to justify a suspension of habeas corpus.249 
 On the one hand, the same justifications for a deferential review 
that are applied to a short-term suspension enacted on the heels of an 
attack can be applied to a long-standing suspension.250 According to Ex 
parte Bollman, whether a rebellion or invasion exists is for the legislature 
to decide.251 Under this view, Congress has the power to end the sus-
pension through the democratic process, and the courts should defer 
to the judgment of the political branches on this issue.252 The fact that 
Congress can build certain limitations into a suspension may influence 
a court as well.253 Despite the fact that the threat of terrorism may con-
tinue for years unabated, there are strong arguments for ensuring that 
the courts do not second-guess the political branches in their assess-
ments of whether the threat to terrorism is any less today than it was on 
September 18, 2001.254 
                                                                                                                      
246 See, e.g., Military Commissions Act of 2006 § 7, Pub. L. No. 109–366, 120 Stat. 2600; 
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 On the other hand, the length of time a person has been detained 
without the right to habeas corpus may tip the balance between the 
need to defer to the political branches and the role judicial review 
serves in protecting individual liberty.255 As the Court in Duncan rea-
soned, the American people have had a historical reluctance in placing 
the execution of the law in the hands of the military without ensuring 
that the courts oversee that the laws are executed faithfully.256 This re-
luctance, described by the Court in Ex parte Milligan, underscores the 
need for judicial review in determining whether the necessary exigen-
cies still exist for a suspension when such threats may no longer be ac-
tual and present.257 Although the Suspension Clause may exist as a 
safety valve to ensure the protection of the nation during tumultuous 
times, it is also a dangerous tool capable of crippling the constitutional 
checks and balances of the government when applied needlessly.258 
This suggests a role for the courts in determining whether the Suspen-
sion Clause is being abused or used for indefinite detainment of pris-
oners absent the necessary exigencies of conflict, while acknowledging 
the courts are poorly equipped to second-guess the legislature on the 
existence of a rebellion or invasion.259 
 The recent U.S. Supreme Court decision in Boumediene suggests 
that time may be an important factor in determining when the courts 
will apply a more searching judicial review.260 In suspension cases, 
whether the threat that originally justified the suspension has dimin-
ished over time could play a major role in determining the role of the 
courts.261 Although the political branches may be afforded deference 
by the courts when the exigencies of the war on terror make it unrealis-
tic to comply with habeas corpus petitions by suspected terrorists, the 
longer the detainees are held under a suspension and the further the 
nation moves temporally from a terrorist attack, the weaker this argu-
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ment for deference becomes.262 The government’s argument that ter-
rorism presents threats sufficient to constitute an invasion under the 
Suspension Clause is similar to the arguments made in Boumediene, and 
there the Court held that too much time had elapsed without the judi-
cial oversight that habeas corpus demands.263 When a suspension of 
habeas corpus spans years in a conflict without an end in sight, a court 
may reason that the drafters of the Suspension Clause did not envision 
this kind of suspension—the clause is no longer being used as a safety 
valve, but as the primary tool for fighting terrorism.264 The indefinite 
nature of the suspension itself, stretching for almost six years in Boume-
diene, rather than the exact definition of rebellion or invasion, appears 
to be the tipping point in determining whether a court will engage in a 
searching judicial review to establish if the threat of an invasion still ex-
ists sufficient to close off the courts and suspend the writ of habeas 
corpus.265 
Conclusion 
 Judicial review of the suspension of habeas corpus has been all but 
written off during periods of American history. The war on terror has 
challenged our assumptions about how clear the presence of an inva-
sion or rebellion might be and may force the courts to question 
whether complete deference should always be granted. 
 The Supreme Court’s 2008 decision in Boumediene v. Bush evi-
denced the role that the actual duration of a detention plays in deter-
mining how much deference should be granted to the political 
branches. Although domestic exigencies may require the Court to ab-
stain from fully reviewing a suspension, the Court expresses reluctance 
to embrace a “normalization of emergency conditions.” Once a reason-
able amount of time has passed, the Court became increasingly con-
cerned with the lack of judicial oversight that habeas corpus affords. 
This may be the tipping point between the competing standards of judi-
cial review of a suspension articulated by Professor Amanda L. Tyler be-
cause it represents the point at which individual liberties are more 
threatened than the public safety. Instead of attempting to meet the im-
possible task of determining whether an invasion or rebellion exists, a 
court would likely focus on the indefinite nature of the suspension itself. 
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 Given the need to ensure public safety amid conflict, the historical 
reluctance to second-guess the legislature on suspensions is under-
standable. Nevertheless, the war on terror has created a new form of 
conflict that may challenge the courts with circumstances unlike any 
faced in the nation’s history. The standard for review must be able to 
adapt to deal with the ever-present threat of terrorism, a threat that 
could lead to a long-standing suspension with no end in sight. There-
fore, the courts must weigh the individual case of the prisoner, and the 
indefinite nature of their detainment, in light of the circumstances sur-
rounding the detainment. In the case where the courts are not shut off 
amid conflict, the courts must do everything in their power to prevent 
indefinite detainments and preserve the Suspension Clause’s historical 
role as a safety valve. 
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